Introduction
What can we expect from a poker protocol? How close to reality can we come?
From the outset of this research, we realized that a cryptographic protocol could achieve more security than its real life counterpart (with physical cards). But every protocol proposed until now was far from offering all the possibilities of a real deck of cards or could not acheive the full security we were expecting.
Since Shamir, Rivest and Adleman first stated a solution to the mental poker problem [SRA] , many protocols trying to implement a fully secure game have been proposed. Although SRA proved in the two player case that such a solution is not possible from an information theoretic point of view, such solutions might be possible when the players' computational power is limited. The leakage of partial information, found by Lipton [Li] , in the initial SRA protocol was fixed by Goldwasser & Micali [GM1] , in the two player case, using probabilistic encryption. Unfortunately this scheme did not extend to a larger number of players. No complete solution to the multi-player version of the problem is yet known. All proposals make special assumptions, like the players' inability to establish secret communications [Yu] & [BF] or the existence of a trusted third party [FM] .
To conceive a complete poker protocol, some constraints must be followed :
• Uniqueness of cards • Uniform random distribution of cards • Absence of trusted third party • Cheating detection with a very high probability • Complete confidentiality of cards • Minimal effect of coalitions • Complete confidentiality of strategy Each card must appear once and only once, either in the deck or in the hand of one player. The only case when a card may appear more than once must be the result of some detectable cheating.
The hand of each player must depend on decisions made by every players, so that none of them has any control on his hand or on his opponents'. Every possible hand must have an equal probability and be accessible to all players.
No trusted party may be assumed, since any human can be bribed, and no machinery is entirely safe because no tamper proof device can be achieved.
Any attempt to cheat must be detected. The probability that a player may cheat without being detected must decrease very fast (exponentially) with respect to some security parameter that the players must decide before the game. Also the amount of work to accomplish the protocol should increase reasonably (polynomially) with respect to this parameter. The value of this parameter will depend on the confidence the players have towards each other, and the maximum computation power they can achieve.
No partial or total information about any card from the deck may be obtainable without the aproval of every opponent. Also, no information may be obtained from a player's hand without his approval.
When more than two players are involved, some players could establish secret communication and exchange all their knowledge about the game, the protocol or any secret data involved in the protocol. Notheless they should not be able to take advantage of this. This information should be equivalent to the cards they separatly have in their hands. In other words, as long as one player is not cheating, nobody can learn more about his hand, or about the cards in the deck, than what they can deduce from the cards in their coalition.
Finally, it is strategicly very important in the game of poker that the loosing players may keep their cards secret at the end of a hand. All the concept of bluffing is based on this fact. Therefore, an ideal protocol should neither force the players to reveal their hands nor any information leading to some knowledge about them.
Our protocol fully implements a secure game achieving the first six properties. Only the confidentiality of the strategy remains unsolved, as all players will be requested to reveal all their information in the detection of cheating phase of this protocol.
This protocol is based on the implementation of the new concept of Hiding-Revealing transactions. These transactions enable a party A to pick a value from a set known to a party B without letting B know which element A has picked.
Our multi-player protocol is a direct extension of our two player version. Let us first describe this simplified protocol. Suppose that P 1 and P 2 want to play a fair game of poker. Assume that each of them will cheat if he can do so (without being detected).
Assume a correspondance between the cards and the set {1,2,3,...,51,52}. So from now on, numbers from 1 to 52 will be used to describe the cards themselves.
Cards shuffling
To shuffle the deck of cards P 1 picks at random a permutation π 1 of {1,2,3,...,51,52} and P 2 picks π 2 . Accessing any card will be done via these two permutations. Each player P i locks his permutation π i using a locking function that must satisfy some special properties described below (which two well known cryptosystems will be shown to satisfy). Then P i posts the locked version of π i . A card will be accessed by π 2 (π 1 (k )) for k ∈ {1,2,3,...,51,52}. Since a player doesn't know the permutation of his opponent, the value π 2 (π 1 (k )) cannot be predicted by either player. To get a card, a player would like to compute π 2 (π 1 (k )) from k and the encoded permutations (with the collaboration of his opponent) without revealing the outcome of his calculation. This is clearly easy for P 2 , but tricky for P 1 .
Requirements
To play the game, each player will have to pick four functions, (L ,U ,H ,R ) according to the rules described below. Briefly, these functions will be used in the protocol to transfer information from one player to another. Suppose a player owns a set of values V . He will show a perfectly hiden version of his elements using the locking function L . The opponent will be able to select a value from V , without revealing which one, by choosing a locked element c , hiding it with H , asking the first player to use U in order to release some trap-door information about H (c ), and finally inverting the hiding he did previously, using R on U (H (c )) to read the value he has chosen. If H and R have some "good" properties, then the owner of the set V will not be able to determine the value chosen by his opponent, nor will his opponent learn anything on the other values in V .
The following properties summarize sufficient conditions to built our protocol. This general approach is followed by two fundamentally different implementations. The presentation is done in a general framework in order to avoid mixing practical implementation details with the high level aspects of the scheme.
Let V be the value space ( in this case {1,2,3,...,51,52} ⊆ V ). Let S be the seed space. Let C be the coded (locked) message space. Let K be the unlocking key space. Let M be the mask space. Let A be the ambiguous value space.
such that (the full meaning of the following properties will become clear in the next sections)
7) Their exists some polynomial time algorithm for each of L ,U ,H ,R , but U includes trap-door information which is computationally infeasible to derive from L ,H ,R .
Here \/ -P \/ -P x ∈X means: "for all x ∈X , except a number of elements smaller than any polynomial fraction in log(#X )".
Protocol
Assuming the existence of such functions (two implementations are given later), we describe our protocol. Let i ∈{1,2}.
Preparation Protocol
Each player P i :
Step 3. Picks π i a permutation of {1,2,...,52}.
Step 4. Posts 
. This is why property 3 is essential.
Initially, every v ∈{1,2,3,...,52} is marked as "free". Suppose P 2 wants to get a card, Card Reading Protocol 1
Step 1. P 2 picks at random a "free" value v ∈ {1,2,3,...,52}
and marks v as "used".
Step 2. P 2 asks P 1 for the value of π 1 (v ).
Step 3. P 1 reveals π 1 (v ) to P 2 .
Step 4. P 2 secretly computes π 2 (π 1 (v )), which is his card.
At the end of the game, P 1 will be able to produce a proof that the value revealed (π 1 (v )) was correct by showing s 1,v so that P 2 can compare L 1 (π 1 (v ),s 1,v ) with l 1 (v ). P 1 cannot cheat on this, since l 1 (v ) uniquely determines π 1 (v ) by property 1.
At the end of the game, if P 2 claims to have the card π 2 (π 1 (v )) in his hand, he will be able to produce a proof of this by revealing s 2,π1(v ) so that P 1 can then compare L 2 (π 2 (π 1 (v )),s 2,π1(v ) ) with l 2 (π 1 (v )). Again, P 2 cannot cheat on this, due to property 1. So this transaction is fully secured. Now suppose P 1 wants to get a card, Card Reading Protocol 2a (not sufficient in general)
Step 1. P 1 picks at random a "free" v ∈{1,2,3,...,52}
and marks it as "used".
Step 2. P 1 secretly computes π 1 (v ).
Step 3. P 1 picks m ∈M 2 and computes h =H 2 (m ,l 2 (π 1 (v ))).
Step 4. P 1 asks P 2 to compute the key k to h .
Step 5. P 2 returns k =U 2 (h ) to P 1.
Step 6. P 1 computes:
Since H has property 5, P 2 gets strictly no information on π 1 (v ) from h since any of the l 2 's may have been used with equal probability.
We call this (Step 3 to Step 6) a Hiding-Revealing transaction between P 1 and P 2 . In this transaction P 2 has revealed a secret value to P 1 , namely π 2 (π 1 (v )), without knowing which one he has given away. At the end of the game P 1 will be able to check this transaction when asking P 2 to reveal s 2,π1(v ) , P 1 can compare L 2 (π 2 (π 1 (v )),s 2,π1(v ) ) with l 2 (π 1 (v )). The only remaining problem is proving to P 2 that P 1 did not fool him in making him decode something else than H 2 (m ,l 2 (π 1 (v ))) . How can we force P 1 to respect the protocol?
First, let us see how P 1 could cheat. Suppose P 1 asks P 2 to decode h′ =H 2 (m ,l 2 (π 1 (v′ ))) for v′ ≠v , instead of h . Then P 1 will get π 2 (π 1 (v′ )) when claiming he has been accessing π 2 (π 1 (v )). This could be interesting for P 1 , for instance, if v′ is marked as "used" because π 2 (π 1 (v′ )) is in fact a card in P 2 's hand. This would allow P 1 to know one card of his opponent, at cost of not knowing one of his own. But at the end of the game, P 1 will not know what π 2 (π 1 (v )) is. So if P 1 is asked to reveal all the cards he should have accessed, he won't be able to do so. ( In fact P 1 may decide to access the card later in the game but in that case the problem will carry over to this new card he pretends to read ).
But P 1 could be more subtle than that. He could try to get partial information on many cards at once. Maybe P 1 claims to follow the protocol, when in fact he is asking P 2 to decode some special value g =G (l 2 (1),...,l 2 (52)) instead of h , hoping that G′ (l 2 (1),...,l 2 (52),U 2 (g )) returns relevant information (partial or total) on more than one entry of π 2 , for some easily computable functions G :C 52 →A , G′ :C 52 ×K →V 52 he has discovered. This way, he might find out what π 2 (π 1 (v )) is and get additional knowledge on some other cards.
Our general solution to this problem takes advantage of property 6. P 2 will ask P 1 , at the end of the game, to reveal π 1 (v ), s 1,v and m . This allows P 2 to compare l 1 (v ) with L 1 (π 1 (v ),s 1,v ) and h with H 2 (m ,l 2 (π 1 (v ))). But this is not yet a proof of P 1 's fairness. Maybe P 1 computed m a f ter he received the answer k in Step 5.
Suppose P 1 uses g as defined earlier. Afetr he gets k =U 2 (g ) from P 2 , maybe he can deduce π 2 (π 1 (v )), additional information on π 2 , and some m such that g =H 2 (m ,l 2 (π 1 (v ))). However, if we force P 1 to publish a coded copy of m before making Step 4 of the transaction, then to prove a fair access to π 2 (π 1 (v )), P 1 would have had to compute m be f ore learning k . But this is not possible from property 6 because from g and l 2 (π 1 (v )), P 1 cannot compute m . So P 1 is fair if and only if he knew m before the value of k was revealed to him.
To implement this solution, we use a (possibily trap-door), public one-way function O 1 that hides all partial information on its inputs and add one step to our protocol (notice that this modification is not necessary for one of the implementations proposed in section 5) :
Card Reading Protocol 2b
Step 1. P 1 picks at random a "free" v ∈ {1,2,3,...,52}
Step 4a.P 1 posts O 1 (m ).
Step 5. P 2 returns k =U 2 (h ) to P 1 .
This way, P 2 can check later that P 1 knew m before Step 4 of the transaction. The fact that the one-way function hides all partial information is important. In some implementations it is possible for P 2 to compute {m      ---i , 1 ≤ i ≤ 52 such that H 2 (m ,l 2 (i ))=h }. If O 1 did leak some information, then the correct m could be found or the set of possible candidates could be reduced, according to the leaked information, and P 2 would gain some knowledge about π 1 (v ).
During the game, cards can be picked from the deck or discarded just by marking (with "used" or "discarded",respectivly) the appropriate element in {1,2,3,...,52}. (e.g. to discard π 2 (π 1 (v )) just mark v as "discarded".)
At the end of the game all secret information must be published as proofs of fairness of the players. But some care must be taken in the implementations where the O i functions are not used, to avoid revealing some secret item too soon. Otherwise a cheating opponent could forge a fairness proof from what he just learned. So, proofs of fairness must be done in the following way. To prevent a cheater from forging a proof, each player must execute Step 1 before anyone does Step 2 since Step 2 is used to prove that the values revealed in Step 1 were the correct ones. Also each one must execute Step 2 before anyone does Step 3 since learning the s 's may be a clue to the successful forging of m .
Proof of Fairness Protocol
Each player P i reveals:
Step 1. π 1 (v ),π 2 (π 1 (v )) for each v he has accessed.
Step 2. All m ∈M used for some Hiding-Revealing operations.
Step 3. π i (v ) and
This enables the opponent to check the transactions and to be sure that no cheating took place. The generalization to more than two players is found in section 6.
Implementations
We now propose two implementations of this protocol. The first is based on RSA [RSA] and the efficient probabilistic encryption scheme of Blum & Goldwasser (BG) [BG] . The second is based on the probabilistic encryption scheme of Goldwasser & Micali (GM) [GM] . This first version matches the general pattern given above.
Using RSA/BG.
Let P be one of the players. P selects p ,q two larges primes; large enough for the least 6 RSA bits to be 1/2+(1/poly(log(pq )))-secure ( see [CG] ). Let n =pq . P selects ε,δ such that εδ ≡ 1 (mod φ(n )). Then define V ={0,1,2,3,...,63}, S =K =M =A =Z Z n * , C =V ×S . (x ↓n ) denotes the least n significant bits of x and + denotes the bit-by-bit exclusive-OR.
Where m −1 is the multiplicative inverse of m (mod n ) and c =(v (c ),s (c )). BG is the BlumGoldwasser encryption function (see [BG] ); in this implementation, one can use BG in the following way. P picks a random s 0 ∈S , and compute s k =s k −1 ε mod n , 1 ≤ k ≤ (  n  ⁄6). P then posts s 6  n ____ and <(s 0 ↓6)(s 1 ↓6)...(s 6  n ____−1↓6)> + m . Here <...> denotes the concatenation of the given blocks of 6 bits. According to [BG] , no partial information about m can efficiently be computed from these two public values. At the end of the game P will have to reveal s , then everybody will be able to compute s 1 ,s 2 ,... and recover m by inverting the + . It will also be possible to check that this is the correct s 0 since s 6  n ____ is uniquely decodable.
Theorem: L ,U ,H ,R satisfy properties 1 to 7 (assuming inverting RSA is hard).
Proof:
2)Since the 6 least significant bits of s are 1/2+(1/poly(log(n )))-secure.
3)RSA is assumed hard to invert. Being given the last 6 bits of s can at best speed up finding s by a factor of 64.
6)Suppose we have x ∈Z Z n * . If a polynomial fraction in log(#M ×C ) values of H (m ,c ) were easy to invert given c , then we could choose a k =s (c k )r k ε x for polynomially many random c k ,r k and with a very high probability, find a solution to a k 0 =H (m ,c k 0 ) (k 0 is one of the values attempted), using that inversion algorithm. One can check that mr k 0 −1 would then be a solution to (mr k 0 −1 ) ε ≡x (mod n ). This would imply we can invert RSA.
7) Clearly L ,U ,H ,R are easy to compute.
In this first implementation we need O to solve the cheating problem. But in this next one, no O is required. Data expansion may be greater in this second version but the simplicity obtained worth the difference.
Using Probabilistic Encryption (GM).
Let P be one of the players. P selects p ,q two larges primes. Let n =pq . P selects η such that
is the Legendre symbol of x over p ). Then define
is the Jacobi symbol of x over n ) Denote x =(x 1 ,x 2 ,x 3 ,x 4 ,x 5 ,x 6 )∈X ,where (x ,X ) is any of (v ,V ),(c ,C ),(s ,S ),(k ,K ) or (a ,A ). Denote also m =(v (m ),s (m ))∈M =V ×S and (c × c′ ) j = (c j c′ j mod n ). 
Where λ(x ,y )=y 2 η x mod n and υ(x )=    1 if x is not a quadratic residue mod n 0 if x is a quadratic residue mod n . Note that these functions are inspired by those defined in [GM2] .
Theorem: L ,U ,H ,R satisfy properties 1 to 7. (assuming the quadratic residuosity assumption (QRA)) Proof:
2) Known property under QRA. (see [GM2]) 3) True under QRA. Because the ability to compute s from v and L (v ,s ) would allow to extract square roots, hence factor n wich is hard under QRA. This implementation is particular because no encoding of m ∈M is needed to prove that someone knew m before using it in the Hiding-Revealing transaction. This is because of the next result:
Theorem: m cannot be computed from U (H (m ,c ) ) and c , for any m ∈M ,c ∈C .
Proof: U (H (m ,c ) ) is independent of s (m ).
Suppose P j makes a hiding-revealing transaction with P i . If he doesn't know m before the transaction he cannot know it after since s (m ) cannot be computed from U (H (m ,c ) ). So to prove that he knew m before the transaction, P j just has to prove he knows it at the end of the game, since nothing has revealed this value to him after the transaction or later in the game.
Multi-Player protocol
We now extend the previous protocol to the multi-player problem. Suppose that P 1 ,P 2 , . . . ,P j want to play poker. The preparation protocol is identical to the two-player version. A card will be accessed as π j (π j −1 (π j −2 (... (π 2 (π 1 (v )) )...))) for v ∈{1,2,3,..., 52}. Suppose P n , n ∈{1,2,...,j } wants to get a card.
Card reading Protocol 3
Step 1. P n picks at random v ∈{1,2,3,..., 52}
Step 2. v 1 =v
Step 3. FOR i =1 TO n −1 DO Step 3.1 P n asks P i to reveal π i (v i );
Step 3.2 P i answers π i (v i ) publicly;
Step 3.3 P n sets v i +1 =π i (v i );
Step 4. P n secretly computes v n +1 =π n (v n );
Step 5. FOR i =n +1 TO j DO
Step 5.1 P n secretly gets v i +1 =π i (v i ) using the Hiding-Revealing protocol with P i ; Step 6. P n 's new card is
This way, P n computes v j +1 =π j (π j −1 (π j −2 (...(π 2 (π 1 (v )))...))) and nobody except himself knows v n +1 ,...,v j ,v j +1 . All the proofs of fairness described in the two-player version can be used again in the multi-player case. Again depending on the implementation, O i 's may be needed to obtain proofs of fairness in the Hiding-Revealing protocol. Finally the order of revelations at the end of the game must be the same as in the protocol for two players when those O i 's are not used.
